Judge Posner has commented on the bankruptcy bill and suggested that it will result in a reduction of interest rates and a transfer of wealth from imprudent borrowers to prudent borrowers, which if true would arguably be a good thing. However, I don’t think that will be the case.
Most credit card issuers use risk-based pricing, so rates for prudent borrowers presumably will not be changed in response to the bill, as those rates don’t presently contain any significant bankruptcy premium.
Unfortunately for high-risk, high-rate borrowers, the market mechanisms that would drive rates down in response to the reduction in bankruptcy risk rarely apply. For the most part, these borrowers were originally extended credit at favorable rates, but because they were late in making payments (2 late payments in 6 months is a common standard) or because their credit score has dropped they get hit with penalty rates of 24% or more. These rates are imposed retroactively to their existing balances, not just to new transactions, so these borrowers’ ability to reduce the impact of the penalty rate by simply switching to another credit card provider for new charges is substantially reduced. Moreover, these borrowers’ capacity to transfer balances to competing cards is often limited compared to that of low-risk borrowers. As a result, the credit card companies that impose these rates may do so with only limited risk of losing revenue to competitors, and therefore have limited incentive to pass their reduced bankruptcy costs to these borrowers.
Is there a sweet spot in the risk curve where the bankruptcy premium in current rates is significant and where competition will require a reduction of the premium? I doubt it. Even if such a sweet spot does exist, I doubt it poses much of a threat to credit card company profits.
Rather than precipitating a transfer to the prudent from the imprudent, the bankruptcy bill will result in a transfer to the politically connected from the politically unconnected.